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Public perceptions of climate change are known to differ between nations and
to have ﬂuctuated over time. Numerous plausible characterizations of these
variations, and explanations for them, are to be found in the literature. However,
a clear picture has not yet emerged as to the principal trends and patterns that
have occurred over the past quarter-century or the factors behind these changes.
This systematic review considers previous empirical research that has addressed
the temporal aspects to public perceptions. We address ﬁndings that have been
obtained since the 1980s and using a range of methodologies. In this review,
we consider early, seminal work examining public perceptions; survey studies
carried out over long timescales and at an international scale; detailed statistical
analyses of the drivers of changing perceptions; and qualitative research featuring
a longitudinal component. Studies point to growing skepticism in the latter 2000s
in some developed countries, underpinned by economic and sociopolitical factors.
Even so, in many parts of the world, there has been growing concern about
climate change in recent years. We conclude that the imbalance in the literature
toward polling data, and toward studies of public perceptions in Western nations
(particularly the United States), leaves much unknown about the progression of
public understanding of climate change worldwide. More research is required that
uses inferential statistical procedures to understand the reasons behind trends in
public perceptions. The application of qualitative longitudinal methodologies also
offers the potential for better appreciation of the cultural contexts in which climate
change perceptions are evolving. © 2014 The Authors.WIREs Climate Change published by John
Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
How to cite this article:
WIREs Clim Change 2014. doi: 10.1002/wcc.321
∗Correspondence to: capsticksb@cardiff.ac.uk
1School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK
2Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research
3Climate Change Consortium of Wales
4Centre for Integrated Energy Research, University of Leeds, Leeds,
UK
Conflict of interest: The authors have declared no conflicts of
interest for this article.
INTRODUCTION
The ways in which individuals, societies, and poli-ties respond to climate change are in many
cases contingent on public perceptions of its causes,
consequences, and wider implications.1–3 As such,
understanding popular opinion on climate change is
critically important. Particularly (but not only) in
states with electoral systems, policy legitimacy mat-
ters at all stages of the policy process, for both private
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and public entities.4 In the context of climate change,
the major emissions reductions required, the develop-
ment and deployment of low-carbon energy technolo-
gies, and the implementation of adaptation measures
all require some degree of citizen involvement, from
the granting of policy mandates to active behavioral
change.5,6
Alongside influences such as lobbying by incum-
bent interests, and institutional and structural factors,
all of which may compel or constrain political
responses to climate change,7 public opinion has
compounded the widespread political reluctance
in many countries to enact legislation that could
be received unfavorably by electorates and by the
powerful economic interests that both support and
depend on those electorates.8–11 At the individual
level, behaviors of significance for climate change
may be influenced by a person’s attitudes toward cli-
mate change, but they are also subject to these wider
sociocultural and political factors12–14, which, while
from a psychological perspective are considered exter-
nal and contextual, from a sociological perspective
are internal to the understanding of climate change
dilemmas. The ways in which these individual and
structural factors inter-relate are complex14,15 but
the types of attitudes which have been shown to be
important as influences on public and private sphere
action include individuals’ recognition of the reality
of climate change, acceptance of a human component
in the causation of climate change, degree of concern
about its impacts, and beliefs about personal and
wider responsibilities for addressing it.15–17
For some time now, a majority of people world-
wide have been of the view that climate change is a
serious problem, and that people are already being
harmed by it.18 Such wide-ranging public concern and
awareness have developed since the emergence of cli-
mate change as a major environmental concern during
the 1980s.19,20 This said, there has been widespread
unease expressed in more recent years that sections of
the public appear to have lost faith in climate science
and scientists, and that the public and experts may be
increasingly diverging in their assessments about cli-
mate change.21,22 In some parts of the world, there
has been a growth in public skepticism about climate
change (however defined23–29) since the late 2000s.
This has been attributed to a range of factors, includ-
ing climate fatigue, misleading media representations,
the global financial crisis of 2008, and social attenua-
tion of risk.30
Temporal changes in public perceptions of
climate change warrant careful attention, as trends
in opinion can be consequential for national and
international responses to climate change and may
be underpinned by a range of different social forces
and physical phenomena. With over two decades of
research on public perceptions of climate change,
we are now in a position to take stock of the key
trends over this time period. There has, to date,
been no attempt to review the full range of literature
relating to trends in public perceptions of climate
change (though there have been earlier overviews of
polling data in the United States,20,31 as well as some
commentary on international polling over time32,33).
Here, we present findings from a systematic lit-
erature review of studies on public perceptions of cli-
mate change, that have used longitudinal methods to
examine patterns of change and to identify the drivers
of trends in public opinion. We also include early,
seminal research in order to contextualize public per-
ceptions and research approaches at the time climate
change was beginning to be recognized in the public
domain.
While acknowledging that public opinion for-
mation, patterns, and trends can be analyzed and
understood through different paradigms (e.g., polit-
ical science)34,35 our primary focus here is on atti-
tudinal trends as revealed through direct measures
of public perceptions. Data sources of relevance here
are primarily public polls and surveys (but also some
interview, focus group and ethnographic data), rather
than proxy indicators of opinion such as newspaper
coverage, internet searches, or membership of cam-
paign groups, which are often used as measures of
‘issue salience’ or ‘concern’ among citizens.11 Sur-
veys provide more direct, ‘demand-driven’ indica-
tors of public concern than newspaper indices, which
are at least partly driven by newspaper agendas and
in turn likely to influence or reinforce public opin-
ion (i.e., ‘supply driven’); while internet search data
(e.g., Google Trends) and campaign/political group
membership capture more active (collective) public
responses to social issues.11 Yet, while methods such
as surveys can provide a useful gauge of opinion—and
also offer insights into knowledge, beliefs, and individ-
ual responses—they are often underpinned by individ-
ualistic assumptions that may construct ‘the public’
in certain (limited) ways,36 as well as being subject
to methodological limitations (e.g., question framing),
some of which we discuss later in this review.
The objectives of this review are fourfold.
First, to outline international trends and patterns in
public perceptions of climate change over the past
quarter-century; second, to summarize the available
longitudinal evidence on what might account for
these; third, to highlight the types of approaches
being used to examine the temporal component of
public perceptions of climate change; and, fourth, to
© 2014 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
WIREs Climate Change International trends in public perceptions of climate change
draw conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses
of the available research and to point to areas as yet
under-developed.
Early studies in particular, and some continuing
work in the United States and elsewhere, have used
the terms ‘global warming’ and ‘greenhouse effect’
synonymously with ‘climate change’. For consistency,
throughout this review we use only the latter term,
while acknowledging that variations in terminology
can lead to different types of responses from public
participants,37–39 a point to which we return later.
SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW
For this study, we carried out a literature search,
using the principles of a systematic literature review,
to identify relevant articles addressing changes in pub-
lic perceptions of climate change over time. The Web
of Science database was searched for publications
published between 1980 and 2014, using a Boolean
search term designed to retrieve a comprehensive
body of work addressing public perceptions of climate
change.a This search identified 2610 citations, from
which a prospective list of 240 studies was derived,
based on a preliminary inspection of article titles and
abstracts. The 240 articles were fully screened by three
of the authors of this study, followingwhich 35 articles
were retained for the purpose of the present review.
The criteria for inclusion were as follows: (1) the study
presents original empirical data, detailed original anal-
ysis and/or commentary on pre-existing empirical data
(e.g., opinion polls) concerning climate change per-
ceptions; (2) the study utilizes data at more than one
time-point, in such a way as to inform understand-
ing of changes in public perceptions over time; and (3)
the study addresses change over time in such a way
as to be generalizable to a wider population or pop-
ulation group (as opposed to, e.g., laboratory exper-
iments with no clearly defined target population). In
order to put recent trends into historical perspective,
we additionally incorporate seminal cross-sectional
research studies of public perceptions from the late
1980s and early 1990s. These were obtained through
extraction as part of the systematic review described
above, plus three further early studies of which the
authors of the present review were previously aware.
Furthermore, because many large-scale international
and longitudinal survey studies (e.g., conducted by
polling and think-tank organizations such as Gallup
and Pew Research Centre) have not been published
in the academic literature, we incorporate 18 studies
from the gray literature and web-based publications,
also using the inclusion criteria above. The selection
of this material has necessitated some discretion on
the authors’ part, given the large number of reports
available which have commented on changing public
opinion. One further qualitative longitudinal study of
which the authors were previously aware and which
matched inclusion criteria was also included.
The final literature review included 39 peer-
reviewed publications and 18 studies from the gray
literature and/or web-based reports. The review
approach utilized for the present study is outlined in
Figure 1.
Overview of the Identified Publications
The studies obtained from the literature review fall
into four main types, which we use to structure our
discussion of changing public perceptions.
First, we consider findings from some of the
earliest and relatively small-scale studies carried out
in the 1980s and early 1990s. This research is useful
for understanding the nature of public awareness of
climate change at this early point in time, such as
a commonplace conflation between climate change
and stratospheric ozone depletion. To a large extent,
these early studies appraised the accuracy of people’s
knowledge in comparison to expert understanding,
and were conducted only in developed nations.
Second, we provide an overview of findings from
representative survey and polling data carried out
since the early 1980s across the globe. As this sec-
ond type of study incorporates a large amount of
material across an extended time span, we divide this
section into four time periods, reflecting broad shifts
in public perceptions. These studies enable insights
to be obtained into public perception trends at the
macro level; however, for the most part do not pro-
vide direct, empirical evidence of the drivers of such
trends.
Third, we outline findings from studies utilizing
time series and other inferential statistical approaches
to draw conclusions about the drivers of changing
public perceptions, such as socioeconomic and mete-
orological factors. These studies provide some of the
most robust insights into the reasons behind chang-
ing public perceptions. They are, however, limited to
examinations using a limited number of variables, and
have been conducted only in developed nations.
Fourth, we outline insights obtained from a
small number of qualitative (e.g., anthropological)
studies that have directly considered a temporal com-
ponent to public perceptions. Whilst qualitative work
is able to offer in-depth insights into people’s under-
standing of climate change, there has to date been little
focused analysis undertaken of how such understand-
ing has itself changed over time.
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Publications identified in Web of Science database
n = 2,370 studies excluded following screening of titles, abstracts
Publications retained for further screening of full text
n = 205 excluded following further screening
n = 2,610
n = 240
n = 35
n = 57
Publications retained for review
Additional studies incorporated from grey literature / web
(n = 18) and of which authors previously aware (n = 4)
Publications and studies included in the review
Types of studies
1. Early studies (n = 7)
2. Descriptive polling (n = 33)
3. Studies linked to events / time series (n = 12)
4. Qualitative longitudinal studies (n = 5)
FIGURE 1 | Systematic review process.
The body of work obtained from the literature
review is summarized by study type and key features
in Table 1.
TRENDS IN PUBLIC
PERCEPTIONS—INSIGHTS
FROM THE LITERATURE
We now examine in detail the identified literature, in
order to provide an overview of changes in public
perceptions of climate change since the 1980s.
Early Cross-Sectional Research—Public
Perceptions in the Late 1980s and Early
1990s (Study Type 1)
We begin by considering seven small-scale,
cross-sectional studies carried out in the late 1980s
and early 1990s in the United States, New Zealand,
and Sweden. For ease of comparison, we also discuss
here a later replication of one of these early studies
undertaken in 2009. The studies considered here
were some of the first to examine perceptions of
climate change, at a point in time when it remained a
relatively novel concept in public discourse.
One of the earliest such studies entailed ethno-
graphic interviews with householders, carried out
across four U.S. states between 1989 and 1992.40,41
This work concluded that climate change was starting
to feature in people’s understanding through being
integrated into their existing conceptualizations of
environmental risks. For example, climate change
was often categorized as a subset of stratospheric
ozone depletion, such that the burning of fossil
fuels was perceived to contribute to the ‘hole’ in
the ozone layer. Climate change was also often con-
flated in people’s understanding with localized air
pollution. Interestingly, this early research found that
participants were of the view that the weather had
already changed, an observation which has fre-
quently been repeated in subsequent studies of public
perceptions. 42
Early research carried out in New Zealand in
198943 concluded that, at this time, awareness of
the subject of climate change was already universal
(96% of a national survey sample having heard of it)
although knowledge about the ‘basic facts’ of climate
change was limited, with almost half the respondents
knowing nothing about its causes, and only a quarter
aware of the relevance of fossil fuel use. As with early
U.S. studies, a confusion between ozone depletion
© 2014 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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and climate changewas identified—study participants,
e.g., suggested that ozone depletion was a cause
of climate change, or related higher temperatures
associated with climate change to increased ultraviolet
radiation.
This early work for the most part applied a
‘deficit’ model44 in appraising public understand-
ing, concluding, e.g., that people’s views were
‘seriously at variance with the scientific models of
global warming’.41 Likewise, mental models and
survey-based research carried out in 1992 in the
United States45,46 reported that public understanding
‘suffer[s] from several basic misconceptions’.45 This
research again made the observation that most par-
ticipants confused climate change with stratospheric
ozone depletion, and were unaware of the causal role
of anthropogenic carbon dioxide. Participants at this
time-point were, however, argued to have a reason-
able understanding of the consequences of climate
change (e.g., temperature increases and changes to
precipitation).
The mental models research described above is
of particular interest when tracking changes in pub-
lic perceptions over time, as this has been one of the
only pieces of early academic research to have been
replicated at a later date. Some 17 years after their
original research46 was carried out, in 2009, levels
of awareness and comprehension of climate change
were found to be far higher, at least among edu-
cated individuals.47 Respondents in the more recent
survey were also more likely to mention fossil fuel
use and energy use in general, as a cause of cli-
mate change; conversely, the erroneous association
with ozone depletionwasmuch diminished. Strikingly,
however, this research also found that people’s convic-
tion that anthropogenic climate change is occurring
was no higher in 2009 than it had been in 1992, that
nonanthropogenic causes were even more frequently
cited than previously, and that conflation of the con-
cepts of ‘weather’ and ‘climate’ were as pronounced as
they had been at the time of the earlier research.
Another early research project, using mixed
methods and carried out in 1990 in Sweden,48
observed that whilst a majority (92%) of participants
had heard of climate change, most were unaware of
its causes and consequences. A conflation with ozone
depletion was again observed, and linkages between
energy use and climate change were poorly perceived.
For example, around a third of respondents’ preferred
method for addressing climate change was through
reducing chlorofluorocarbon (CFC)-using aerosols,
with only 6% opting for energy saving.
These early studies, and the public misconcep-
tions reported therein, related largely to the physical
and scientific aspects of climate change. A more com-
plete exploration of perceptions surrounding the per-
sonal and societal implications of climate change
would only become a focus in later work.
We next consider research which has examined
public perceptions of climate change over time using
nationally representative polling data taken at multi-
ple time-points.
Survey Data—Changes in Indicators over
Time (Study Type 2)
Multiple polls and research projects examining pub-
lic perceptions of climate change are now regularly
undertaken across the world. Here, we consider find-
ings from 33 studies, which we divide into four indica-
tive time periods broadly reflecting both the types
of survey findings obtained and the shifts in empha-
sis of researchers over these time periods: (1) 1980s
and early 1990s, showing increases in knowledge and
awareness; (2) mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, a period
marked by growing public concern but also variability
in opinion; (3) mid- to late-2000s, showing declin-
ing public concern and increasing skepticism in some
nations, with polarization of viewpoints within and
between nations; and (4) 2010s, which so far suggest
possible stabilization of public concern about climate
change. Reflecting the greater availability of U.S. data,
this is discussed in more detail; however, as far as pos-
sible we have endeavored to give equal attention to
other regions.
Surveys and opinion polls since the 1980s have
assessed public perceptions in a variety of domains
through the use of precisely worded questions. A
focus of many surveys has been to measure public
attitudes toward the physical and scientific aspects of
climate change (e.g., beliefs about an anthropogenic
component); other questions have examined the extent
to which people see climate change as a ‘problem’
or threat; as well as gauging levels of public concern
and support for action at the national and individual
level. Although a formal thematic analysis of the types
of questions asked across these studies is beyond
the scope of the present review, some of the main
constructs of interest are presented in Table 2, together
with example survey items and response categories,
and illustrative citations.
Whilst we review survey studies from across
the globe, it is important to note that mean-
ings of ‘climate’ and ‘climate change’ vary within
and between cultures, and that for nonscientists,
local cosmologies,49–51 and emotional and sensory
perceptions52,53 are critical to the way climate change
is interpreted. Rudiak-Gould,50 e.g., points out that
© 2014 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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TABLE 2 Survey Measures of Public Perceptions
Question Focus Illustrative Survey Item Response Options
Example Studies in
Which Item Reported
Awareness and
understanding of
climate change
Have you heard or read anything
about the issue of global warming?
Yes/no/not sure Refs 20, 32
Thinking about the issue of global
warming, how well do you feel you
understand this?
Very well/fairly well/not very
well/not at all
Ref 20
Existence of climate
change at present
time
As far as you know, do you personally
think that the world’s climate is
changing, or not?
Yes/no/don’t know Refs 73, 74, 105
Do you think that global warming is
happening?
Yes/no/don’t know Ref 70
Causes of climate
change
Please list all of the things that you
think could cause global warming
Open-ended response Refs 46, 47
Assuming global warming is
happening, do you think it is… ?
Caused mostly by human
activities/caused mostly by
natural changes in the
environment (also ‘none of the
above’ and ‘other’)
Ref 70
Perceived threat from
climate change
How much you think [the greenhouse
effect] threatens your personal
health and safety?
7-point scale from ‘minimal threat’
to ‘clear threat’
Ref 58
Please tell me how serious a problem
you personally believe global
warming to be in the world?
Very serious/somewhat serious/not
very serious/not serious at
all/don’t know
Refs 33, 57
How serious a problem do you think
climate change is at this moment?
10-point scale from ‘not at all a
serious problem’ to ‘extremely
serious’
Refs 71, 88
How serious a threat is global
warming to you and your family?
Very serious/somewhat serious/not
very serious/not serious at
all/don’t know
Ref 80
Seriousness of climate
change compared to
other issues
Which of the following do you
consider to be the single most
serious problem facing the world as
a whole?
Eight possible ‘problems’
presented, including climate
change, ‘the economic
situation’, and ‘armed conﬂicts’
Refs 71, 88
What do you think will be the most
important problem facing the world
in the future?
Open-ended response (climate
change coded together with
other ‘problems’)
Ref 154
Certainty of climate
science (with respect
to existence,
causation)
Most scientists agree that humans are
causing climate change
5-point scale from ‘strongly agree’
to ‘strongly disagree’
Refs 23, 74
To the best of your knowledge, what
percentage of climate scientists
think that human-caused global
warming is happening?
0% to 100% Ref 70
Is there solid evidence that the
average temperature on earth has
been getting warmer over the past
few decades, or not?
Yes, mostly because of human
activity/yes, mostly because of
natural patterns/don’t know
Refs 78, 79, 92, 112, 115, 122
© 2014 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Overview wires.wiley.com/climatechange
TABLE 2 Continued
Question Focus Illustrative Survey Item Response Options
Example Studies in
Which Item Reported
Personal concern or worry
about climate change
[Do] you personally worry about
global warming a great deal, a fair
amount, only a little, or not at all?
A great deal/a fair amount/only a
little/not at all
Refs 20, 31, 64, 124
Are you very worried, somewhat
worried, not very worried or not at
all worried about global warming?
Very worried/somewhat
worried/not very worried/not at
all worried
Ref 59
How concerned, if at all, are you about
climate change, sometimes referred
to as global warming?
Very concerned/fairly
concerned/not very
concerned/not at all
concerned/don’t know/no
opinion
Refs 73, 74, 91
Requirement for action on
climate change (at
national and personal
level)
Do you think the United States
should—or should not—agree to
abide by the provisions of the Kyoto
agreement on global warming?
USA should abide/USA should not
abide
Ref 31
[Regarding] whether it is necessary to
take steps to reduce the impact of
human activities thought to cause
global warming or climate change.
Would you say that you believe
that… ?
It is not necessary to take any
steps/it is necessary to take
modest steps over the coming
years/it is necessary to take
major steps starting very
soon/don’t know
Refs 32, 65
I am prepared to greatly reduce my
energy use to help tackle climate
change
5-point scale from ‘strongly agree’
to ‘strongly disagree’
Refs 74, 116
Open-ended/spontaneous
response permitted
When you think of ‘global warming,’
what is the ﬁrst word or phrase that
comes to your mind?
Open-ended response Ref 26
Would you like to make any further
comments about climate change?
Open-ended response Ref 72
Items are abridged in some cases; some studies cited conduct secondary analysis of polls or overview previous findings.
the concepts most commonly used to correspond to
climate and climate change in the Marshall Islands
can refer to a broad range of environmental and
cultural phenomena, including social transitions and
even beliefs about changes to the passage of time
itself. This author suggests that similar processes
are likely to be relevant in other parts of the world,
particularly given that for many societies ideas of
culture and nature are not conceptually distinct.
Although some separate research has argued that
shared ideas about climate change do indeed exist
across diverse cultures internationally,54 the potential
for cross-cultural variability in notions of climate
change should nevertheless be borne in mind as a
limitation in the case of the international comparisons
of climate change perceptions reported in this section
of the study.
With respect to intranational variability in cli-
mate change perceptions over time, a separate issue
arises as to the potential for movement on key
indicators (e.g., people’s level of concern or acceptance
of the reality of climate change) to be overinterpreted
as demonstrating a significant shift in public mood,
rather than as reflecting the typical variability that is
to be expected between polls and over time.55,56 With
respect to public perceptions of climate change, there
has at times been a tendency in media reports—as well
as the research literature—to assert such shifts without
reference to criteria (particularly any statistical basis)
required to confidently draw those conclusions.
Although it is unclear at the present time what
might constitute ‘normal’ variation in public per-
ceptions of climate change over time, in an effort to
preclude the drawing of undue inferences from polling
data in the present review, we interpret changes over
time taking into account the margins of errors of the
surveys used. The margin of error provides an indica-
tion of how reliable results are, and is dependent on
population and sample size. Most of the studies and
public opinion polls reviewed in this section of the
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study have a sample size of around 1000 (which yields
an approximate margin of error of ±3% at the 95%
confidence level). We therefore only report differences
between two time-points where confidence intervals
do not overlap (for most surveys, corresponding to a
difference between two time-points of 6% or more)
except in cases where findings are supported by sta-
tistical tests by the original authors, or are based on
the interpretation of multiple polls by the authors of
the studies reviewed.
1980s to Early 1990s: Increasing Knowledge
and Awareness
Being the point in time at which data on public
opinion toward climate change was just starting to
be gauged, data from the 1980s are inevitably sparse
compared to recent years. However, such evidence
as there is suggests that during this decade public
awareness, knowledge, and concern rose steadily, soon
reaching levels comparable to those obtained in recent
years.
Based on a review of several hundred polling
studies carried out in the United States, including
at this early time period, Nisbet and Myers20 con-
cluded that public awareness about climate change
underwent a rapid increase through the second half
of the 1980s. These authors presented findings from
separately conducted national polls that showed that
whereas in 1986 less than a half of respondents
(between 39 and 45%) reported having heard or read
anything about climate change, this proportion rose to
around three-quarters (74%) of respondents by 1990.
These authors noted, however, that levels of overall
understanding were limited.
As in the earlier small-scale studies described
above, larger-scale survey studies also point to a
conflation with localized air pollution, CFCs and
ozone depletion in respondents’ attribution of causes
of climate change33. Nevertheless, even at this early
point in time, respondents from many parts of the
world were already of the view that climate change
had begun to happen.57,b
Despite limited levels of understanding during
this early period, polls nevertheless show public con-
cern rose rapidly. In one of the first polls of its kind to
be conducted, only 43% of U.S. respondents in 1982
saw climate change as either a ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’
serious problem. Over three subsequent survey waves,
this figure reached 75% by 1989,58 as illustrated in
Figure 2. This finding is paralleled in other indicators
taken during the late 1980s measuring the perceived
level of threat from climate change. For example,
whereas only 37% of respondents in 1984 perceived
that climate change constituted a future problem for
one’s children or grandchildren, this had risen to 65%
by 1988.58
Findings from national surveys across 24 coun-
tries in 199233,57 also showed that pluralities in each
of these countries already viewed climate change as a
subject of concern, with just over half of all respon-
dents at an international level rating it as a ‘very
serious’ problem. There was substantial variability
between nations at this time, however—ranging from
26% of Nigerians and 34% of Finns considering cli-
mate change to be ‘very serious’, to 72%of Portuguese
and 73% of Germans.
Some limited polling data also offer insights
into changing perceptions in Europe around this time.
Survey research from 1988, based on over 10,000
respondents from across Europe, found that more
than three-quarters of respondents were already
worried about climate change (43% reported being
‘very worried’ at this time, a further 33% ‘somewhat
worried’). In a subsequent survey wave in 1992, the
proportion of Europeans assigning these categories
then rose to almost 9 of 10 respondents (with 62%
‘very worried’ and 27% ‘somewhat worried’ by this
point)59 although it should be noted there were dif-
ferences in question wordings used between the 1988
and 1992 survey waves.
These studies, taken together, suggest that at the
time climate change was coming to have a degree of
political prominence toward the end of the 1980s on
both sides of the Atlantic60,61 levels of public aware-
ness and concern were already reaching relatively high
levels. Given the associations made with a range of
other topics, this may however have been connected
to a nonspecific growth in public environmentalism
over previous decades62 as much as an appreciation
of climate change per se.
Mid 1990s to Mid 2000s: Growth
and Fluctuation in Concern
Whereas the 1980s and early 1990s were marked by a
growth in basic awareness and concern about climate
change worldwide, the period that followed entailed a
sustained growth of public concern overall, but with
this occurring alongside substantial international and
intranational variation. The overall growth in concern
mirrors a rise in media attention to climate change, in
turn associated with growing scientific evidence and
political attention.63
In the United States, the extent to which the
public report they personally ‘worry’ about climate
change has risen and fallen several times since the
late 1980s.20 As shown in Figure 3, the remarkable
volatility in this indicator of personal concern has
been particularly evident since the late 1990s; we also
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FIGURE 2 | Early trends in public perceptions in the United States. Data points show how ‘serious’ U.S. public survey respondents considered
climate change to be during the 1980s. Data obtained from Ref. 58 (n≥ 1000 at each time-point).
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FIGURE 3 | Changing levels of ‘worry’ about climate change in the United States. Data points show the extent to which U.S. public survey
respondents reported personally worrying about climate change over a 25-year period. Data combined from Refs 20 and 64 (n≥ 1000 at each
time-point).
include here data showing continuing variation to the
present time.20,64
Despite the temporal variability in this measure,
a review of more than 40 U.S. surveys focused on the
early 2000s nevertheless concluded that the weight
of public opinion in the period 2001–2004 strongly
favored U.S. participation in the Kyoto Protocol and
decisive action on climate change, in direct contrast
to national policy at this time.31 In 2004, e.g., nearly
three-quarters (71%) of U.S. respondents supported
the country’s participation in the Kyoto Protocol, with
only 19% opposing.31
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By the year 2007, support for substantial
action to mitigate climate change was evident at the
international level. Brechin32 has argued that data
from several cross-national polls point to growing
public concern about climate change worldwide in
the 2000s, as well as to strong public support at this
time for climate mitigation policies. Likewise, from
a synthesis of eleven international polls conducted
between 2003 and 2007, Kull et al.65 argued that
concern about climate change cross-nationally was by
now widespread and growing, with large majorities
acknowledging that human activities caused climate
change, and supporting policies aimed at emissions
reduction. For example, the proportion of publics
across 14 countries viewing climate change as a ‘very
serious’ problem increased between 2003 and 2006
(with only two further countries for which repeated
measures data was available, India and Mexico,
showing slight decreases in this measure over time).66
Similar comparisons between 2000 and 2006 also
show broad-based increase in international concern.67
Likewise, a poll of 10 European countries carried out
in both 2005 and 2007 showed a sharp rise in the
percentage of respondents who considered it ‘very
likely’ they would be personally affected by climate
change—increasing from 36 to 55% over this time
period.68
Mid 2000s to Late 2000s: Increasing Skepticism
and Polarization
In general, the interpretation placed by researchers
upon polls up to the mid-2000s affirms a widespread
increase in awareness among the public, and the
establishment of a popular consensus for action on
climate change, albeit against a backdrop of varying
personal concern in some countries. Survey studies
from the latter part of the 2000s and early 2010s
have, by contrast, often emphasized the proliferation
of public doubts and skepticism about climate change.
Perhaps most surprisingly, given the growing scientific
consensus on the basic reality and human contribution
to climate change, have been indications in some parts
of the world that publics have become less accepting
of these matters. Although trends at this time do
appear to indicate growing skepticism about climate
change, it is nonetheless important to note that clear
majorities in many countries still expressed high levels
of concern and recognition of the problem throughout
this period.30
Between the years 2006 and 2009, a decline
was observed in the proportion of U.S. citizens
of the opinion that global temperatures were ris-
ing, and that weather patterns in their localities
were changing—although a large majority did still
accept the former proposition.69 Separate data like-
wise point to a sharp drop between 2008 and 2010
in the proportion of U.S. citizens who accepted cli-
mate change is happening, that it had an anthro-
pogenic component, or that there was scientific con-
sensus about its human causes.70 During the mid- to
late-2000s, related research found that the types of
imagery people spontaneously associate with climate
change moved progressively in a skeptical direction.
Smith and Leiserowitz26 carried out an analysis of
responses to open-ended survey items which asked
participants to state ‘the first thought or image that
comes to mind’ in relation to climate change. Based on
answers provided over four time-points, these authors
showed that through the 2000s in the United States
the extent to which climate change was associated
with what they term ‘naysayer’ imagery increased dra-
matically. This imagery centered most prominently
on associations with climate change as a conspiracy
theory, together with denials of the existence of cli-
mate change and assertions that it was a natural phe-
nomenon. Whilst ‘naysayer’ imagery accounted for
less than 10% of responses in 2002, this rose to 23%
in 2010.
Similar findings have been obtained elsewhere
in the developed world. Across Europe as a whole,
over three surveys conducted during 2008 and 2009, a
decline in the perceived seriousness of climate change
was observed.71 In Australia, an increasing tendency
for survey respondents to view climate change as exag-
gerated and/or to denigrate policy designed to address
it, was recorded across the 2008–2011 time period.72,c
Within Great Britain, too, survey findings from the
mid-2000s pointed to an increase in public doubts
about the basic reality of climate change. Whereas
only 4% of people in 2005 were of the view that the
world’s climate is not changing, this had risen to more
than one in seven people (15%) by 2010, with the per-
ceived risk from climate change also decreasing over
this time period.73,74 Separate research in England by
Whitmarsh25 drawing on survey data from 2003 and
2008 drew the conclusion that the most significant
element of increasing public skepticism concerned the
perception that the seriousness of climate change is
exaggerated, with an almost doubling of this percep-
tion over the 5-year period. Likewise, Ratter et al.75
point out the declines in several measures of public
perception of risk from climate change in Hamburg,
Germany, around this time. These authors note, e.g.,
that the proportion of respondents considering climate
change to be a ‘serious threat’ dropped from 17% in
2008 to 9% in 2011.
Whilst the research described above was not
designed to directly attribute reasons for increases in
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skepticism over time, both the Smith and Leiserowitz,
and Whitmarsh studies25,26 argued that a process of
politicization of climate changewas likely to have been
a significant contributing factor. The former authors
suggested that with the shift in political context in the
United States following the election of Barak Obama,
climate change came to constitute a ‘litmus test’, with
conservative Republicans aligningwith climate skeptic
positions as ameans of differentiating themselves from
Democrats.
Other survey-based research would appear to
empirically bear out the notion of growing polariza-
tion, particularly in the latter 2000s. McCright and
Dunlap76 demonstrate a statistically significant inter-
action between political orientation and survey year
over the 2000s in the United States. These authors also
point out that whilst political polarizationwith respect
to people’s views on climate change had already begun
in the early 2000s, the division is increasingly evident
between 2008 and 2010. Whereas in 2001 there was
an 18% difference between liberals (67%) and conser-
vatives (49%) concerning whether climate change had
already begun to happen, this develops into a much
larger 45-point difference by 2010, at which time 75%
of liberals and 30% of conservatives were of this
view.
Separate analyses affirm that polarization of the
U.S. public’s views on climate change gathered pace in
the late 2000s.77–79 Brewer78 observes that increasing
partisan disparity occurred subsequent to Obama’s
election in 2008 on a survey indicator examining
acceptance of the reality of climate change, although
a widening gap was less clear for other measures
examined. Guber79 argues that U.S. citizens weremore
polarized on the topic of climate change in 2010 than
at any other point in time, or on any of the other social,
economic, and foreign policy topics considered in her
analysis.
In addition to variability and polarization
observed within the United States in particular, it is
important to note that survey research also points
to substantial heterogeneity in the ways public per-
spectives have changed over time at an international
level.
The very broadest international trends across
the late 2000s are illustrated by polling across 111
countries, carried out by Gallup in both 2007–2008
and 2010.80 These data show that across this time
period there were wide regional and global varia-
tions in public opinion trends, both with respect to
the perceived risk arising from climate change, and
the recognition of an anthropogenic component. In
both the United States and Western Europe, sharp
declines occurred between 2007/2008 and 2010 in the
proportion of respondents viewing climate change as
either a ‘somewhat serious’ or ‘very serious’ threat to
themselves or their family. By contrast, in Latin Amer-
ica and sub-Saharan Africa increasing proportions of
people considered climate change to represent a threat
in these terms—although the differences over time for
these regions are relatively small and may be close
to the margins of error for these survey data. Con-
cerning the extent to which respondents saw climate
change as being connected to human activities, again,
declining proportions were of this view in the United
States andWestern Europe, whereas in parts of Africa,
developing Asia, and Latin America, the human com-
ponent to climate change was increasingly coming to
be acknowledged.80
Divergences in public opinion are also obtained
on a country-by-country basis toward the end of the
2000s. Table 3 shows broad regional trends based
on Gallup data between 2007/2008 and 2010 as
described above, as well as from nations selected to
illustrate both rising and falling public risk perception
worldwide. Whilst it cannot be stated with certainty
that the smaller changes shown in this Table are
significant (e.g., a 2% change in risk perception
for the Commonwealth of Independent States) these
data can nevertheless be considered illustrative of the
heterogeneity of trends occurring worldwide over this
time period.
Separate research carried out by the Pew
Research Center’s 2007–2010 Global Attitudes
Project81 has also concluded that there were pro-
nounced variations cross-nationally at this time,
with some nations reporting sharp increases—and
others sharp decreases—in the percentages of people
considering climate change to be a ‘very serious’ prob-
lem. Reasons for such international variations and
diverging trends in opinion are little understood and
complex, although clearly aspects of the surrounding
physical and social contexts are important, includ-
ing levels of risk exposure, cultural values, political
context, and the nature of media coverage. With
respect to the growth in concern in Latin America in
the late 2000s,80 this may be related to a growth in
climate justice activism linked to left-wing political
activism at this time, as well as to the occurrence
of extreme weather events.82,83 Conversely, recent
analyses have argued that in the United States and
other Anglophone countries, right-wing think tanks
and media outlets have been key players in a ‘con-
servative counter-movement’ that has emerged to
challenge climate policy.84–87 We consider studies that
have carried out empirical analyses of the influence of
such political factors on changing public opinion in a
subsequent section of the review.
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TABLE 3 Proportions of Survey Respondents Considering Climate
Change to be a ‘Threat’
% Considering Climate
Change to be a Threat
Region or Country 2007–2008 2010 Change
Latin America 67 73 +6
Sub-Saharan Africa 29 34 +5
Commonwealth of
Independent States
42 44 +2
Developing Asia 31 31 0
Middle East & North Africa 42 37 −5
Developed Asia 79 74 −5
Eastern/Southern Europe 67 60 −7
USA 63 53 −10
Western Europe 66 56 −10
World average 41 42 +1
Mongolia 30 54 +24
Philippines 42 60 +18
Ecuador 69 85 +16
Uganda 30 45 +15
Morocco 29 41 +12
Haiti 35 18 −17
Sudan 42 26 −16
France 75 59 −16
Czech Republic 39 28 −11
United States 63 53 −10
Data obtained from Ref 80.
Late 2000s to the Early 2010s: A New Phase
for Public Perceptions?
Cross-national divergences in public opinion trends
appear to be continuing to the present time.
Nevertheless, there are signs that in some parts
of the world public concern about climate change is
stabilizing and in some cases increasing.
Surveys undertaken across the 28 member states
of the EU between 2009 and 2013 suggest that the
relative importance of climate change has remained
largely consistent over this more recent time period.88
At each of three time-points (2009, 2011, and 2013)
between 16 and 20% of respondents considered cli-
mate change to be the single most serious problem
facing the world as a whole. When permitted to select
more than one area of concern, around a half of
respondents consistently considered climate change to
be among the most serious problems facing the world
in each of the 2009–2013 surveys.88
There have been less consistent trends at an
international scale over this time period. Globescan
data appear to show that at an aggregate, global
level, concern has continued to decrease since 2009.89
Disaggregated by country, however, these data suggest
that whereas concern in many developed countries
(UK, USA, Canada, and France) has stabilized during
the 2010s, the trends for developing countries have
been more mixed, with some countries (e.g., China,
Mexico, and Kenya) seeing falls in public concern.90
Separate survey data from Britain available to 201391
suggest that the proportion of people expressing con-
cern about climate change has continued to decline
over this period, however. Compared to 82% express-
ing concern in 2005, and 71% in 2010, only 60% did
so by 2013. In Britain, doubts about the reality of cli-
mate change have likewise continued to increase, with
almost one in five (19%) of respondents doubting its
existence in 2013, compared to only 9% in 2005.91
Some U.S. polls appear to point to a halt in
the downward trend on a number of indicators, and
suggest that climate change may be returning to the
public agenda. Data from the Pew Research Center
show that the proportion of the U.S. public of the view
that there is ‘solid evidence’ that the Earth is warm-
ing has increased steadily from a low point of 57%
around 2009 to 67% by October 2013.92 Similarly,
the proportion of people stating that human activity
is the main cause of climate change has risen from
36 to 44% over the same period, a trend observed
among Republican as well as Democrat voters.92 Sepa-
rate polling data to 2014 further show a steady growth
in the proportion of Americans of the view that climate
change has a human cause from 2010 onward, which
is again observed among both Democrat and Repub-
lican voters.93 This is accompanied by an increase in
the number of people worrying ‘a great deal’ about
global warming from 25% in 2011 to 34% in 2014
(see Figure 3). Other research in the United States sug-
gests more modest increases in acceptance and con-
cern about climate change, however. The Yale Project
on Climate Change Communication reports that more
U.S. respondents accept that climate change is hap-
pening in 2014 (64%) than in early 2010 (57%), a
difference that is only slightly larger than the margins
of error of the surveys; furthermore this figure remains
lower than that obtained by this project toward
the end of the 2000s.94 Similarly, the proportion of
respondents who report being ‘worried’ about climate
change, whilst largely stable over the 2010s to the
most recent data point in 2014, is nevertheless lower
than that obtained by this project in the late 2000s.94
It is unclear, and would be unwise to speculate,
as to the likely direction of future trends in these
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types of polling data. It may tentatively be concluded
from the more recent evidence available, however, that
the declines in some measures observed in the 2000s
appear to have slowed in the United States and Europe
as a whole, although this pattern is not observed in
many major developing countries. Research attention
is now required to examine prospective trends and
patterns in public perceptions across multiple regions,
with a view to understanding how and why these
develop in the coming years.
Time Series Analyses and Studies Examining
Drivers of Change (Study Type 3)
The trends described above can plausibly be accounted
for by a range of factors. Particularly with respect
to the declines in public concern observed during
the second part of the 2000s, contributory factors
may include cycles of media and political attention,
deliberate attempts by some actors actively to under-
mine climate science, and a wider politicization of cli-
mate change with the associated public distrust this
brings.30 One prominent theoretical explanation has
been that people only have a ‘finite pool of worry’
available and that where other pressing concerns—
such as the implications arising from the financial cri-
sis of 2008—dominate, then these may diminish the
attention paid to climate change.95
Given the variety of possible explanations for
changing public perceptions, analyses which utilize
longitudinal data to directly examine the underlying
reasons for changes in public perceptions are partic-
ularly valuable. Studies of this sort can be divided
into three types, each of which we consider below:
(1) measurement of public perceptions of climate
change before and after the occurrence of significant
events (five studies); (2) time-sensitive analyses of the
relationships between meteorological data (e.g., tem-
perature) and public perceptions (four studies); and
(3) time series analyses that use data from several
time-points to test the relationships between socioeco-
nomic variables and attitudes toward climate change
(three studies).
Public Opinion Before and After
Significant Events
Directly prior to the Kyoto conference in 1997 and the
signing of the Kyoto Protocol to limit international
greenhouse gas emissions, a substantial effort was
made by the Clinton administration in the United
States to build public support for action on climate
change, leading to what Krosnick et al. describe as a
‘major national debate’ on the subject.96 In order to
ascertain whether the heightened media attention and
changed political landscape at the time had affected
Americans’ beliefs and attitudes toward climate
change, these authors administered a survey in two
waves, the first in September/October 1997 and the
second between December 1997 and February 1998.
This study found that among the U.S. public as a
whole, and indeed among those for whom climate
change was a personally salient topic, attitudes were
largely unaffected by the 1997 debate. However, evi-
dence was obtained that the debate did have a polar-
izing effect, whereby Democratic respondents moved
in favor of action on climate change and on a range
of other measures (in line with the Clinton admin-
istration’s position) at the same time as Republican
respondents moved in the opposite direction. These
findings are in line with the longer-term polling studies
outlined above showing polarization of opinion in the
United States,76–79 and furthermore underline how
key national events such as the attention in late 1997
to climate change in the context of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol can trigger shifts in public opinion in opposing
directions.
A rather different form of communication
around climate change occurred with the release of
the 2004 film The Day After Tomorrow, in which a
major environmental disaster occurs as a consequence
of climate change. As Leiserowitz et al.97 show, this
film generated more than 10 times the media cov-
erage in the United States of the 2001 IPCC report.
Because of these factors, as well as the large number
of people who viewed the film (around 30 million
in the United States), we include consideration of
this study here as a national ‘event’ which had the
potential to affect public opinion on a large scale.
Using a quasi-experimental design, Leiserowitz et al.
argued that for those who viewed the film, attitudes
toward climate change had altered (e.g., they reported
more concern about climate change, and more
pro-environmental behavioral intentions). Based on
nationally representative surveys undertaken immedi-
ately before and after the release of the film, the study
nevertheless concludes that The Day After Tomorrow
was not itself influential enough to have significantly
altered U.S. public opinion at a national scale.
Another putative influence on public opinion
was the so-called ‘Climategate’ affair of late 2009,
in which emails obtained from the University of
East Anglia’s Climate Research Unit (CRU) gener-
ated extensive skeptical commentary about the sci-
ence of climate change. This has been widely per-
ceived as a particularly damaging episode for pub-
lic trust in climate science.98,99 However, despite
there being extensive consideration in the research
literature of the implications of ‘Climategate’ for the
© 2014 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
WIREs Climate Change International trends in public perceptions of climate change
conduct and representation of climate science (e.g., see
Grundmann99), there has to our knowledge been only
one published study which has directly examined the
impact of this episode on public opinion (although
see Anderegg and Goldsmith100 for a discussion of its
impact on internet search terms as an indicator of issue
salience).
Drawing on data gathered in 2008 and then
in 2010, Leiserowitz et al.101 measured respondents’
belief in the reality and human causation of cli-
mate change, degree of personal concern, and trust
in information sources. The 2010 survey was car-
ried out around 2months after the CRU e-mails were
first posted online and 1month after the story had
appeared in mainstreammedia. In addition to replicat-
ing items from the 2008 survey, this second survey also
asked a series of questions about respondents’ recall
of, and attitudes toward, the ‘Climategate’ episode.
Over this time period, these authors found there had
been sharp declines in several attitudinal measures,
including trust in climate scientists. They argued fur-
thermore that this could be directly connected to peo-
ple’s degree of exposure to the story. In line with
the studies of opinion polarization described above,
this effect was, however, largely confined to those
who were already predisposed to skepticism about cli-
mate change, whether measured by political orienta-
tion (Republicans) or worldview (Individualists).
A limitation of the ‘Climategate’ study described
above is its reliance on self-report (respondents indi-
cated the extent to which they were aware of the
story). As such, it is possible that those reporting atten-
tion to this news story were also those already less
trusting of climate science. The study authors indeed
acknowledge that a ‘perfect storm’ of other major
events around this time (including the worldwide eco-
nomic recession and shifts in the political landscape)
may have contributed to a wider social attenuation
of risk around climate change, and broader changes
in public attitudes.101 It is also worth noting that a
separate UK poll commissioned for the BBC in early
2010 showed that, among those who stated they had
heard news stories ‘about flaws or weaknesses in the
science of climate change’, there was no evidence that
this media attention had led to more people reporting
reduced levels of conviction about the risks of climate
change, than reported higher levels of conviction as a
result.102
Research examining public perceptions of cli-
mate change has often been carried out in conjunction
with that examining perceptions of other environmen-
tal and technological risks as well as attitudes toward
energy policy, not least due to the fact that nuclear
power has in more recent years been presented as a
low-carbon technology able to contribute to climate
change mitigation.103 Following the disaster that
occurred at the Fukushima nuclear power complex
in Japan in March 2011, two separate studies have
examined whether there were subsequent shifts in
public attitudes toward climate change, as well as
toward nuclear power. Bird et al.104 found that public
concern about climate change in Australia reduced
following the accident, at the same time as pub-
lic support for nuclear power declined. Poortinga
et al.105 also observed changes in public attitudes
toward climate change in the UK (this study drew
on some of the same measures reported in Spence
et al.74). In Japan, however, public acceptance of the
reality of climate change was as high after Fukushima
as before—suggesting that, whilst the accident had
affected Japanese attitudes to nuclear power, this did
not extend to attitudes to climate change.
The two studies described above showed that
UK and Australian attitudes toward climate change
altered in the wake of Fukushima, although neither
claimed that this demonstrates that the accident was
the direct cause of this. Bird et al. did suggest that
relative risk perceptions (whether nuclear power was
seen as ‘worse’ than climate change) may have been
affected. However, as Poortinga et al. argued, the
trends observed in these studies were instead likely
to have been connected to other factors influencing
public opinion at the time, such as structural economic
conditions.
The Role of Weather Conditions and Events
At the time of rising public skepticism in the late
2000s, some commentators suggested that this could
be connected to the unusually cold weather in Europe
and the United States.106,107 Albeit that there are
important distinctions between the two concepts,
‘weather’ is strongly associated with ‘climate’ by
nonexperts37 and current temperature may be used
(consciously or not) to draw conclusions about the
validity of climate change. People’s perceptions of tem-
perature anomalies (e.g., whether they are of the view
that recent weather has been ‘warmer’ or ‘colder’ than
usual) can also affect beliefs.108–110 It is thus plausi-
ble that changingmeteorological conditions may influ-
ence aggregate public perceptions over time.
Here, we consider four studies that have exam-
ined changes in public perceptions in light of varying
weather conditions—each of these was conducted in
the United States. For the purposes of this review, we
only consider studies that have collected public per-
ceptions data at more than one time-point, and related
these to temperature and/or other weather data. These
studies represent a subset of a larger body of work
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TABLE 4 Studies Considering Role of Weather in Changing
Perceptions
Study Citation Time Period Findings
Deryugina (2013)113 2003–2010 Short-term temperature
ﬂuctuations have no
effect; longer-term
(1month to 1 year)
changes predict climate
change beliefs among
conservative voters
Donner and
McDaniels
(2013)112
1990–2010 Temperature anomalies
over previous 3–12
months predict level of
concern, and beliefs
about climate change
Egan and Mullin
(2012)115
2006–2008 Weather anomalies predict
climate change beliefs
although this effect
decays rapidly
Hamilton and
Stampone
(2013)114
2010–2012 Recent temperature
anomalies predict belief
in human causation of
climate change among
unaligned voters
Analyses for each of the four studies are based on U.S. data.
examining public perceptions of weather and weather
events (e.g., see Reser111). The studies we consider are
summarized in Table 4.
Drawing on data from national weather sta-
tion observations, Donner and McDaniels112 exam-
ined the extent to which these corresponded with pub-
lic opinion data over the period 1990–2010. These
authors found that attitudes toward the reality of cli-
mate change, and degree of personal concern, were
both strongly related to temperature anomalies over
the past 12 months—with both attitudinal measures
being lower in the context of colder than usual tem-
peratures, and higher for warmer periods.
Also utilizing weather station data, this time
over the period 2003–2010, Deryugina113 found that
where temperature deviates from the mean over a
short time period of up to 2weeks prior to survey com-
pletion, this did not affect people’s beliefs. However,
more sustained periods of anomalous warm weather
did affect the likelihood that respondents would be
of the opinion that climate change had already begun
to happen—with colder weather having the oppo-
site effect. Interestingly, Deryugina obtained this effect
only for Conservative voters, although did acknowl-
edge that this may have been an artifact of the study
design. Separate work by Hamilton and Stampone114
by contrast observed an effect of temperature anomaly
on perceptions across political orientations, although
this effect was strongest for voters describing them-
selves as ‘Independent’. Again in contrast to Deryug-
ina’s study, which found that longer-term anoma-
lies were more important in altering perceptions, this
research found that the effect of temperature anomaly
was strongest the closer in time that this occurred to
survey completion.
A finding that temperature anomalies can influ-
ence perceptions but that this effect decays rapidly was
obtained by Egan and Mullin.115 These authors used
as their outcome variable responses to a statement
asking whether or not there was ‘solid evidence’ that
the Earth was getting warmer. Again, these authors
observed that deviations in local temperature affected
belief in the reality of climate change. However, this
was found to occur as a function of the absolute size
of the deviation from mean temperature—in contrast
to the finding by Deryugina113 that warmer and colder
weather had contrasting effects on beliefs. Egan and
Mullin also argued that the effect of weather variation
was, in itself, particularly pronounced—comparable
in importance, they argued, to those identified in
the political science literature of boosts in campaign
advertising on voting intentions. Nevertheless, they
also conclude that, under normal circumstances, the
weather’s effect on opinion is ‘fleeting’.
These results, taken together, suggest that
long-term temperature anomalies have a robust effect
on public perceptions of climate change. Because of
the contrasting findings obtained with respect to the
timescale at which these effects occur, it nevertheless
remains unclear whether the influence of the weather
on public opinion is most pronounced for immediate
or for longer-term conditions. It also remains unclear
whether such effects are short-lived or have the
potential to endure over a sustained period. A further
research need concerns assessment of the influence of
discrete extreme weather events on long-term public
opinion. Whilst there is a growing body of literature
that examines individuals’ perceptions of climate
change in response to events such as flooding and
hurricanes111,116–119 it remains unclear the extent to
which this may have effects at the population level.
Sociopolitical, Economic, and Environmental
Drivers of Change
All the research considered in the review thus far
has offered insights into patterns and trends in pub-
lic perceptions of climate change over time; and in
the previous sections we considered evidence of the
role of one-off events in shaping public perceptions,
as well as the role of changing meteorological con-
ditions. Nevertheless, the question of which factors
are most important in driving the shifts in attitudes
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identified has rarely been directly addressed in the lit-
erature. This is problematic because, as we have sug-
gested, there are a wide range of possible explanations
available for changing perceptions of climate change.
Without direct assessment and comparison of socioe-
conomic and other factors as influences on changing
public opinion, there is a risk that such phenomena
as the widely documented increases in public skep-
ticism in the late 2000s come to be associated with
plausible-seeming, but untested rationalizations. For
example, there has been a widespread tendency to
attribute a major impact on public opinion to the ‘Cli-
mategate’ episode,120 but with the exception of the
work we cite above101 there is very little evidence
available to support this.121 Indeed, public concern
about climate change in the United States and UK
had already begun to decline prior to the controversy
generated by this story, with multiple other factors
of potential relevance salient around this time. As we
note above, there has been a tendency in some quarters
for changes over time in polling data to be overin-
terpreted or undue inferences made about the factors
behind shifts in public opinion. Those studies which
have attempted to empirically examine the causes of
changing public perceptions of climate change are,
therefore, of particular value.
One study by Scruggs and Benegal122 that set
out to assess the reasons behind the increase in pub-
lic doubts about climate change in the late 2000s,
compared the influence on public opinion of skeptical
media coverage, short-term weather anomalies, and
economic circumstances—these latter in the form
of unemployment data and an index of consumer
confidence.
This study was able to analyze the effects of each
of these on aggregate public opinion in both the United
States and Europe, as well as to look more closely at
the effects of unemployment and weather anomalies
at the subnational level in the United States through
matching individual-level responses to locally relevant
indicators. These authors’ analysis concluded that an
economic account—contextualized to the recessions
experienced inmany countries in the late 2000s—most
convincingly explained declines in public concern and
acceptance of the reality of climate change, both in the
United States and Europe, at national as well as local
level. As part of these findings, they observed that
within Europe, there was a very strong association
between increases in employment rates and increases
in skeptical opinion on a country-by-country basis.
Whilst the study obtained modest significant effects
for temperature variations upon public opinion,
these were much smaller in comparison to economic
effects.
A second study by Shum123 largely bears out
these findings in the European context. This research
drew on the same European dataset as Scruggs and
Benegal122 to gauge public attitudes concerning the
perceived seriousness of climate change, although
made use of this in a different manner. Shum’s study
also applied figures for economic growth as an eco-
nomic indicator, together with mean temperatures in
the month of August preceding each of three survey
waves from 2007 to 2009. This study concluded that
changes in quarterly GDP growth rates affected atti-
tudes toward climate change at both national and
European levels. The effect of summer temperatures
was limited to an aggregate European level (i.e.,
in warmer years, the European public as a whole
expressed more concern), but the authors acknowl-
edged the limitation of this inference and pointed out
that where analyzed at national level, temperatures
were not influential. A further important observation
was that, controlling for income levels, those countries
in the ‘old Europe’ of the West showed decreased con-
cern over time, in comparison to those countries in
the East where this effect was less pronounced. From
this, Shum makes the prediction that should incomes
in the East of Europe continue to increase, they can be
expected to become among the more concerned coun-
tries with respect to climate change.
From these two analyses, an economic explana-
tion for declines in concern is most apposite. This is
consistent with the ‘finite pool of worry’ hypothesis95
which predicts that concern about one issue—climate
change—will decrease as concern about another—in
this case, economic circumstances—becomes more
salient.
Although it would appear that the economic
downturn has played a part in changing public opin-
ion, it is important to note that the studies considered
above were only able to test this hypothesis against
a limited number of competing explanations (media
reporting and temperature variation). A further fac-
tor argued to have been important in effecting public
skepticism has been the role of social factors involved
in promoting climate change denial, such as conser-
vative think-tanks, media outlets and politicians, and
sections of the media.84–86 Conversely, it might be
expected that advocacy in favor of action on climate
change could raise public concern.
One of the most comprehensive analyses of the
multiple possible influences on public opinion, which
incorporated an assessment of such political ‘cues’ was
carried out by Brulle et al.124 in the United States.
This study used a large number of measures designed
to capture and distinguish between the effects of
extreme weather events, mass media coverage and
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more direct media advocacy of pro/anti positions on
climate change, dissemination of scientific informa-
tion, and ‘elite cues’—the last of these being gauged by
Congressional statements, voting patterns and hear-
ings with respect to climate change.
Brulle et al. concluded from their analysis that
three major factors affected levels of public concern
about climate change over the 2002–2010 period.
They observed, first, that the quantity of media
coverage—itself an indirect measure of the importance
ascribed to climate change as a topic—translated into
public concern. Secondly, and in line with the studies
described above concerning the influence of economic
factors on public opinion, they found that economic
factors (unemployment and economic growth) were
influential—and furthermore that U.S. war deaths in
Iraq and Afghanistan significantly decreased public
concern. These influences they attribute to society hav-
ing a limited amount of ‘issue space’, analogous at
a societal scale to the idea of a finite pool of worry
whereby other issues compete with climate change
for the public’s attention. The study found however
that the most important influence on public concern
about climate change was elite political cues, both
originating from Democratic and Republican sources,
which led to heightening and diminishing of concern
respectively.
Whilst these results clearly demonstrate the
importance of political impetus both for constrain-
ing and motivating public concern, it is important to
note that there are likely to be complex interrelations
between many of the social forces considered. For
example, the publication of the Fourth IPCC Assess-
ment Report may have galvanized support among
some politicians for action; in addition, and as Brulle
et al. point out, media reporting of climate change is
itself affected by economic circumstances and atten-
tion paid to climate change by prominent politicians.
It should also be noted that there may be particular
effects at play in the United States that do not oper-
ate the same way in other parts of the world. This is
not least because the U.S. debate on climate change
appears to be particularly politicized, with analyses
showing that media reporting and wider discussion
of climate change occurs in a very different manner
elsewhere125–127—e.g., Billett128 concludes that the
press in India ‘entirely endorses climate change as a
scientific reality’.
Qualitative Studies with a Longitudinal
Component (Study Type 4)
As both Pidgeon30,129 and Wolf and Moser130 point
out, qualitative approaches provide the potential for
considerable added value over quantitative surveys,
providing far greater depth of explanation and insight
into people’s perspectives on climate change, includ-
ing the complexity of their cognitive and emotional
engagement with the issues involved. Much anthropo-
logical research considering people’s understanding of
and responses to climate change entails engagement
with communities over a sustained period of time,
and many such studies have noted that research par-
ticipants assert the view that the weather and other
factors in their locality have changed over time.131,132
However, despite the growing body of research uti-
lizing qualitative methodologies to understand the
human dimensions of climate change130,133,134 it is
often unclear from such studies how people’s percep-
tions of climate change have, in themselves, changed
over the years. Here we consider five studies which
have included a focus on changing public perceptions,
using qualitative data.
One exceptional study by Paerregaard135 consid-
ered the development of climate change perceptions
over a 27-year period in a traditional community in
the Peruvian Andes. This research achieves such a
comparison over time by drawing on long-term ethno-
graphic field data dating back to repeated visits to
southern Peru in 1986, 1990, and 1993—as well as
recent comparative data obtained in 2011. In contrast
to many of the studies considered in this review, Paer-
regaard states that an explicit aim of this work is to
explore perceptions of climate change among people
‘living on the margins of the global world’.
Among many socioeconomic and cultural
changes observed in this region of study, was the find-
ing that changes in ritual practices were intimately
connected with changes in the ways in which envi-
ronmental change—including climate change—was
conceptualized. Whereas in the 1980s and early 1990s
the vast majority of villagers in the region continued
to participate in ritual practices, such as making offer-
ings to mountain deities, in return fieldwork in 2011 a
growing number of people had grown doubtful about
the effectiveness of offerings and rituals. Such shifts in
practice and attitudes were in turn related to people’s
experience of climate change as one of many external
forces impacting on their locality. In part because of
their experience of changing temperature and water
availability, however, Paerregaard notes that study
participants had by 2011 begun to employ ‘a new
terminology to observe and interpret environmental
change’ and that they ‘talked of the climate as a
phenomenon posing serious threats to their lives’.
Notwithstanding the emergence of climate change as
a meaningful concept for the people in this region,
this author points out that the way in which it was
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understood nevertheless remained distinct in many
ways from a typical Western conceptualization.
The above study is pertinent for drawing atten-
tion to the fact that shifts in understanding of climate
change do not happen in isolation but rather as part
of a pattern of unfolding social changes in conjunction
with changes to physical conditions. Lavrillier136 has
likewise observed that changes in values and attitudes
have occurred in concert with the manifestations of
climate change among the Tungus of Siberia. As this
author notes, climate change has lead both to outlooks
which may be considered positive and adaptive, but
also to a fear of future impacts and challenges to tra-
ditional beliefs and narratives (p. 269):
For the present time, they are … expressing the strong
confidence they have in their ability to adapt. On the
contrary, for the future, their narratives and rituals
express a dread at the thought of being endangered
and a mutation in some perceptions of the environ-
ment. Previously held to be eternally renewable, the
environment is now seen as likely to disappear.
Crate137,138 has also reflected upon how the per-
ceptions of another population in Siberia—in this
case the Viliui Sakha of northeastern Siberia—have
changed over time in the context of climate change.
Having carried out research with these communities
since 1991, writing in 2011 Crate137 commented that
it is only in the past few years that her research partic-
ipants have started to express concern about changing
weather patterns and the timing of seasons, as well as
changes to land formations such as permafrost.
A further study by Capstick139 carried out in the
UK examined changing public perceptions of climate
change over the period 1997–2010 through com-
parative analysis of six separate qualitative datasets
(focus group and interview studies) obtained over
this time period. This research found substantial
continuity over time in the ways in which public
participants expressed their viewpoints across a series
of discourses encompassing the personal, social, and
scientific aspects of climate change. Capstick argued
however that several key changes were evident over
time in how people understood climate change. Whilst
earlier research participants tended to see the scientific
aspects of climate change as undecided or yet-proven,
there was an increasing tendency toward later years
for climate science to be characterized as representing
opposing positions or ‘sides’ indicative of scientific
dispute. In the personal domain, people’s accounts
of their own climate-relevant behavior displayed an
increasingly moralized character over time. This was
also reflected in changing views about wider practices
such as energy-saving and recycling, which were seen
as becoming increasingly routine and normalized
over the period of analysis. A further finding of this
study was that expressions of ‘fatigue’ around climate
change appeared to be a recent development, with
instances of this found only in the 2010 data.
Whilst the studies described above have adopted
disparate methodologies to explore the perceptions
of very different research populations, they neverthe-
less point to the possibility of developing insights into
changing public perceptions of climate change that
take into account people’s shifting values, practices,
and wider cultural contexts. These findings are of a
different character to those obtained from quantita-
tive, usually survey-based, studies that for the most
part dominate the present review. However, such work
offers some clues as to how changing perceptions of
climate change may occur in concert with changing
physical and social conditions which are specific to
particular communities.
CONCLUSIONS
Understanding popular opinion on climate change and
support for measures to address it is critically impor-
tant given the need for profound societal changes asso-
ciated with mitigation and adaptation. Our systematic
review has drawn on diverse quantitative and qual-
itative evidence from a range of countries over the
past quarter century, to demonstrate the growth—and
subsequent fluctuations—in climate change awareness
and concern since the issue emerged into the public
consciousness in the 1980s. After a period of rising
concern to around 2007, polls show a sharp decline
in belief and concern across many developed coun-
tries, followed by stabilization in some parts of the
world since about 2010. While experiences of anoma-
lous weather and other events (e.g., The Day after
Tomorrow; Fukushima; Climategate) appear to have
exerted some influence on public perceptions (or, most
often, perceptions of a sub-group of the population),
time series analyses that take into account a range of
possible explanatory factors (e.g., weather, socioeco-
nomic factors, and political actions) indicate the eco-
nomic downturn and political events have been par-
ticularly influential.
Polling studies also reveal important variations
both within and between countries in these longitudi-
nal trends. Notably, there has been growing political
polarization in the United States, with right-of-center
voters growing increasingly skeptical, compared to
left-of-center voters. This is consistent with per-
vasive ‘confirmation bias’ (the propensity to seek
out and believe information that confirms existing
views140) and interest-based efforts to shape public
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opinion.84,86,87 Between countries, parts of Europe
such as the UK, and Australia and the United States,
appear to have seen a much larger growth in skepti-
cism than other regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa
and South America, where concern about climate
change has tended to increase.
Recent analysis85 finds that media coverage con-
taining skeptical voices is much higher in the United
States and UK than Brazil, China, France, or India;
and that right-leaning newspapers tend to feature
more uncontested skeptical sources in their opin-
ion pages. This reinforces previous U.S. analysis that
shows right-wing think tanks are key players in a
conservative counter-movement that has emerged to
challenge climate policy.84,86,87 Coupled with a partic-
ularly polarized political system and influential fos-
sil fuel industry interests, this may help explain the
unusually high levels of skepticism in the United
States.
Although analyses to date point to a role for eco-
nomic and political factors in particular as influences
on public perceptions, other factors may also have
affected the identified trends. Some of the more sophis-
ticated analyses identified in this review have inferred
causality based on evaluation of multiple datasets,
however these have been limited to extant data and
the assessment of factors which can be straightfor-
wardly operationalized. There are several other plau-
sible influences on changing public perceptions, par-
ticularly in the context of growing skepticism in some
parts of the world. However, there has been little or
no formal analysis of how these may have affected
public opinion. Such influences include the role of cli-
mate ‘fatigue’ (the sense that publics may have lost
interest in the topic, or that it has become an ‘old
story’139,141–144); the possibility that areas of genuine
uncertainty in climate science have come to be con-
flated with aspects about which there is clearer consen-
sus (that Spence et al. term ‘uncertainty transfer’145);
a role for individual and collective denial;146–148 and
a deleterious effect on public attitudes due to climate
change seen increasingly as a political rather than sci-
entific topic.3
Around the time that several polls indicate
diminishing engagement with climate change, the
highly publicised Conference of the Parties (COP15)
took place in Copenhagen, prior to which there were
extensive expectations of international political action
on climate change. That these went largely unfulfilled,
with climate change subsequently receding from the
public and political agenda, likely contributed to the
social attenuation of climate change as a risk.14,30
This may have been further compounded by extreme
cold weather events in the northern hemisphere,
given the potential for colder temperatures to reduce
belief and concern about climate change under some
circumstances.108 Fluctuations in public attitudes may
also be connected to the sorts of issue-attention
cycles evidenced in coverage of climate change by
the media.60,149–151 Again though, to our knowledge,
there has yet been no formal analysis of such cyclicity
in public attitudes toward climate change.
Whilst the research literature has often focused
on declining public concern in the late 2000s in devel-
oped countries, there has been far less attention paid to
the reasons behind growing levels of concern in other
regions. Whereas international comparative polling
shows drops in public concern in the United States
and Western Europe, the reverse trend is evident in
parts of Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. The
reasons for this are far from clear, and warrant fur-
ther research attention. Although much is now known
about public perceptions in developed countries, the
considerable variation in attitudes in many other parts
of the world requires attention to a variety of local-
ized contextual factors.129,152 For example, it would
be valuable in future to follow-up cross-sectional sur-
vey research such as Leiserowitz and Thaker’s detailed
study of climate change perceptions in India,153 to
ascertain whether and how public attitudes are chang-
ing over time and at a regional level.
The nature of the evidence base has also devel-
oped over the timeframe that we have considered.
From the earliest small-scale studies of public ‘under-
standing’, which often focused on disparity with
expert knowledge, the number and type of studies
has burgeoned to many hundreds of regional, national
and international polls, longitudinal time series, and
qualitative analyses. At the same time, the focus of
these studies has expanded beyond a focus on pub-
lic knowledge (or lack of it) to diverse measures of
attitudes and beliefs (including skepticism), perceived
risk and responsibility, willingness to adopt behavioral
measures, policy support, and so on. Yet, as we indi-
cate in Table 1, the literature concerning trends in
public perceptions is characterized by key strengths
and limitations, both with respect to the geographi-
cal location of data collection and analytic approaches
employed.
First, and as we note above, there exists a
substantial bias toward longitudinal studies of pub-
lic perceptions in developed nations. This is under-
standable given the greater availability of research
resources in these parts of the world, but leaves us
largely in ignorance about how public understanding
may have developed—and may be in the process of
unfolding—in other places. It is important to appre-
ciate changing public attitudes in the United States,
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given the scale of its political influence in climate
negotiations, as well as national and per capita car-
bon footprints. However, as the economies of Asia
and South America continue to develop, and as cli-
mate impacts continue to be felt around the globe,
there is a need to understand in some detail the tempo-
ral progression of public perceptions globally. Further
detailed cross-cultural research is therefore required
on the multiple socioeconomic, geographical, polit-
ical, and psychological factors which may underpin
changing public perceptions in key regions of the
world.30,32,67,129
A second, general limitation on much of the
research conducted to date concerns the validity and
idiosyncrasies of survey measures employed. Whereas
survey respondents are typically asked about such
matters as the perceived ‘seriousness’ or level of ‘con-
cern’ about climate change, these are only some of
the possible approaches to conceptualizing public atti-
tudes. Indeed, the argument that climate change is
considered of lesser importance relative to many other
issues has been shown to be highly conditional on the
exact survey question wording used, with one partic-
ular question formulation leading to climate change
being rated more important than all other social issues
presented.154 Likewise, whether study participants are
asked about ‘global warming’ or ‘climate change’
has been shown to significantly affect the types of
responses obtained.37–39 Add to this the methodolog-
ical challenges concerning cross-cultural research (not
least equivalency in concepts between languages) and
it becomes clear that there is substantial scope for
developing this field.
Third, whilst there are numerous studies that
have considered public perceptions data over time,
there are very few which have applied the advanced
statistical techniques necessary to differentiate
between multiple causal factors influencing attitudes
toward climate change. To this end, further work
which adopts and extends the analytic approaches
employed thus far122–124 and in an international
context, would lead to a significant strengthening of
the field.
Related to this, many of the analyses which have
been carried out to date—including a large number
of the studies considered in the present review—have
been premised on individualistic assumptions about
the formation of public opinion on climate change;
for example, those studies which have drawn con-
clusions about attitudes based on the measurement
of psychological and/or experiential factors. Whilst
these types of analyses are useful for explaining the
determinants of, and variability in public perceptions,
they are however unable to account for movements
in aggregate opinion over time which are influenced
by broader sociocultural and political factors.35 Par-
ticularly for areas of policy which are aligned to a
liberal-conservative continuum—which, studies have
repeatedly shown, is the case for climate change—it
has been argued that a collective level analysis is
more appropriate for understanding changes in pub-
lic opinion over time.35,155,156 Although often draw-
ing on similar types of data such as public surveys,
the assumptions and analytic approaches used in such
macro-level analysis instead construe public opinion
as being determined by broader ‘general dispositions’
or policy ‘moods’ which may change slowly, and/or in
a cyclical manner.156
Avenues for future work include bringing
together these distinct disciplinary perspectives,
not only to elucidate public opinion and responses
through different methods and measures, but also
to examine and challenge the assumptions and lim-
itations inherent in these different paradigms. For
example, public opinion polls are often used to con-
struct the public in certain ways (e.g., as apathetic or
ignorant) that serve to close down debate and delimit
the role citizens can play in responding to climate
change (e.g., as consumers rather than citizens).157
More individualistic research framings of the pub-
lic are also problematic as they can serve to direct
responsibility onto individuals for addressing matters
that require collective or policy responses;158,159 and
may limit options for societal innovation whilst rein-
forcing preferred policy options.160 Similarly, studies
of public attitudes may be underpinned by an assump-
tion that there is a simplistic relationship between
climate-relevant individual behavior (e.g., energy use)
and climate change beliefs, or that individual-level
responses are the only level at which domestic emis-
sions can appropriately be addressed, both of which
are problematic assumptions.2,160,161
Finally, further research is needed to elucidate
how public opinion about climate change is cultur-
ally and dynamically shaped over time. Of partic-
ular value would be greater deployment of qualita-
tive approaches to address this question, enabling the
depth of insights attainable from such methods to
shed light on such processes, whether via anthropolog-
ical/ethnographic methodology162,163 or through the
use of qualitative longitudinal techniques.164,165
NOTES
a The search term was structured to return any articles
in which the phrase ‘climate change’ and/or ‘global
warming’ was included in the article title or topic
area, in addition to one or more of the terms ‘public
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opinion’, ‘opinion poll’, ‘attitude’, ‘perception’, and
‘skepticism’ (and variants thereof). The search was
performed on April 22, 2014.
b The survey item relating to whether climate change
had already begun to happen was only asked of those
survey participants who said they had at least some
understanding of climate change.
c This finding is based on a thematic analysis of a small
number of responses to an open-ended question, and
so may not be statistically significant.
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